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HomeMy WebLinkAboutHandouts_Regular_Tab 13_06/09/2011 ������%��� �� ATTORNEYS AT LAW 1111 Hypoluxo Road, Suite 207 o��iii��.aiia� �� 2� ,�.�'-/�6.2 JOHN CORBETT T�LEPHONE (561) 586-7116 TRELA J. WHITE TELECOPIER (561) 586-96ll BRADLEY W. BIGGS*^ KEITH W. DAVIS* R. MAX LOHMAN ABIGAIL FORRESTER JORANDBY � Board Certified in City, County and Loca1 Government Law JENNIFER GARDNER ASHTON ^ State Certified County and Circuit Court Mediator MEMORANDUM TO: Mayor Paterno, Vice Mayor Arena and Council members Brennan, Humpage & Turnquest; Village Manager Couzzo FROM: Keith W. Davis, Esq. DATE: 3une 6, 2011 RE: Special Exception Use; Process and Legal Issues Good Shepherd Episcopal Church has applied for a Special Exception Use, which application will be heard by the Village Council on June 9, 2011. This Memorandum will briefly outline the special exception process as well as the legal issues relevant to that process. Special exceptions are uses which although are allowed to exist and operate, ha�e unique characteristics and require case-by-case analysis of their impacts on neighboring areas and Village infrastructure. Sec. 78-361. In order for the Good Shepherd special exception use to exist and operate, the Village Council must find that the proposed use complies with the seven (7) requirements of Sec. 78- 3b2. In addition, the Village Council must find that the proposed special exception use has made adequate provision for the twelve (12) factors set forth in Sec. 78-363. The Staff Report prepared by the Community Development Department discusses these requirements and factors in more detail. Special exception applications are heard by the Village Council at a quasi judicial public hearing. It is the burden of the applicant to establish, through the presentation of competent, 1 substantial evidence, that they have met each of the above referenced seven (7) requirements and sufficiently provided for each of the above referenced twelve (12) factors. Competent, substantial evidence can be in the form of sworn testimony, the development application as required by Sec. 78-368, or other documents and materials presented to the Village Council at the public hearing. Once the applicant has provided competent, substantial evidence that the proposed special exception use camplies with the above referenced criteria (7 requirements and 12 factors), the burden shifts to the Village to esta.blish that the criteria have not been met and that granting the special exception would be adverse to the public interest in order to properly deny the request. The Village is likewise required to provide competent, substantial evidence at the public heaxing in order to meet this burden. Such evidence can come from sworn testimony or other docuxnents and materials presented to the Village Council at the public hearing. Redner v. City Council o, f'City of'Tampa, 827 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 2" DCA 20Q2). Competent substantial evidence has been defined by the Florida Supreme Court as evidence that is sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached. DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957). In simple terms, competent, substantial evidence amounts to any valid reason supported by the record. Orange County v. Butler, 877 So.2d 810, 813 (Fla. Sth DCA 2004). Based on the competent, substantial evidence presented at the public hearing, the Village Council may grant the request, deny the request or grant the request with the imposition of special conditions designed to protect the surrounding property and neighborhood or the overall public health, safety and welfare of the Village. Sec. 78-364. In the event that the request is denied, the Village Council must state the reasons for the denial by way of explaining which requirement(s) or factor(s) have not been met. Sec. 78-365. A failure to make such findings is considered a departure from the essential requirements of law. Redner v. City Council of City of Tampa, 827 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 2" DCA 2002). Following a denial, the applicant is foreclosed from re-applying for twelve (12) months from the date of such action. Sec. 78-366. 2